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Environmental Law-IMPACT STATEMENTS-AGENCY
MAYBE
REQUIRED
TOFILECOMPREHENSIVE
ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT
STATEMENT WHENCOMTEMPLATING
REGIONAL
CONTROL
OF RESOURCE
DEVELOPMENT-Sierra
Club u. Morton, 514 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir.
1975), cert. granted sub nom. Kleppe u. Sierra Club, 96 S. Ct. 772
(1976).
The Northern Great Plains Province1 contains one of the
largest untapped coal reserves in the United States. For several
reasons, the coal in this province is a desirable resource for satisfying short-term national energy needs. Most of this coal is located on public land under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the
Interior.
On June 13, 1973, the Sierra Club and several other environmental groups filed suit in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
against the Departments of the Interior, Agriculture, and the
Army.l Plaintiffs claimed that these federal agencies were violating the provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 (NEPA)3by controlling coal development in an area defined
by plaintiffs as the "Northern Great Plains Region,"' without
first carefully considering interdisciplinary studies of the area
and preparing a regional environmental impact statement.
The district court granted summary judgment for the government, concluding that the region as defined by plaintiffs had
never been designated for federal development by statute or executive action, and that a regional federal action within the meaning of NEPA did not exist and had never been propo~ed.~
The
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit6 reversed the district court and enjoined the Department of
1. The Northern Great Plains Province covers portions of North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, Wyoming, Nebraska, and Colorado.
2. 514 F.2d 856, 867 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Later in the proceedings, the court allowed
several parties to intervene as defendants: a tribe of Indians, an individual rancher, eight
electric public utilities, three natural gas companies, and four coal mining companies. All
intervening defendants have interests in the coal development on the Northern Great
Plains.
3. 42 U.S.C. § § 4321 et seq. (1970).
4. The region defined by the complaint encompasses north-eastern Wyoming, eastern
Montana, and the western Dakotas. Brief for Intervening Appellees a t 4, Sierra Club v.
Morton, 514 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1975). This area is somewhat different than that delineated by the government as the Northern Great Plains Province. See note 1supra; 514 F.2d
a t 881 n.33.
5. The district court's opinion remains unreported.
6. The panel consisted of Chief Judge Bazelon and Circuit Judges Wright and
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the Interior from approving certain mining plans and railroad
rights-of-way, all of which were covered by the Eastern Powder
River Coal Basin Environmental Impact Statement.' Specifically, the court held that "a comprehensive major federal action
is contemplated in the Northern Great Plains? But, being uncertain about the ripeness of the "contemplated" action, the
court remanded the case with instructions that the federal appellees decide whether to prepare a regional impact statement. The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and stayed the
injunction pending a decision on the merits.

A.

T h e Department of the Interior's Coal Leasing Policy

The Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920' vests in the Secretary of the Interior the major initiative for and control of the
development of all federally owned coal. In particular, the Act
grants the Secretary discretionary authority to lease to private
parties coal extraction and development rights.l0 Early in 1973,
the Secretary of the Interior instigated development of a longterm plan to establish a national coal leasing policy. As part of
the development of this plan, the Department began preparation
of a n impact statement to measure the environmental effects of
all federal coal leasing." Pending issuance of this impact statement, the Secretary announced that the Department of the InteMacKinnon. Judge Wright authored the opinion of the court. Judge MacKinnon dissented
in an extensive opinion.
7. 514 F.2d at 868, 883.
8. Id. a t 878.
9. 30 U.S.C. § § 201-08 (1970).
10. Id. 6 201. The Mineral Lands Leasing Act limits disposition of federal coal deposits to leasing (administered by the Bureau of Land Management), eliminating the previous government practice of selling mineral lands. 514 F.2d a t 863 n.5.
On January 26, 1976, the Department of the Interior announced a new coal leasing
policy that adopts the final proposals of the Energy Minerals Activity Recommendation
System. Under this policy, all leasing will be conducted on a competitive basis. The
Secretary will require the Bureau of Land Management to prepare "regional" impact
statements when such factors as "basin boundaries, drainage areas, [and] areas of economic interdependence" make such a statement necessary. Department of the Interior
Press Release (Jan. 26, 1976).
11. 514 F.2d at 863. The final version of this impact statement was issued in September, 1975. It analyzes the impact of coal leasing to be conducted under the Energy Minerals Activity Recommendation System. The statement covers "some 85 million acres of
identified coal reserves located primarily in the Northern Great Plains and northward
along the Continental Divide from New Mexico and Arizona through Montana." 40 Fed.
Reg. 43239 (1975).
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rior would issue coal leases only to meet the short-term needs of
existing mines. l2
Under the short-term leasing policy, the Department of the
Interior approved four mining plans in Wyoming and Montana
and received requests to approve another four in the same area.13
The government filed impact statements dealing with most of
these plans." One cumulative impact statement was prepared for
the four plans situated in Wyoming's Eastern Powder River
Basin. l5
Subsequently, the Secretary decided to further restrict coalrelated activities on the Northern Great Plains until completion
of the Northern Great Plains Resources Program (NGPRP).16 It
is unclear whether this program is actually a federal effort to
produce a regional development plan or merely a research project
designed to provide a framework for environmental decisionmaking.17 It is certain that the NGPRP is not equivalent to an
12. 514 F.2d a t 863. The announcement stated that coal leases would be issued only
under the following conditions:
(a) When coal is needed now to maintain an existing mining operation; or
(b) When coal is needed as a reserve for production in the near future; and
(c) When the land to be mined will in all cases be reclaimed in accordance with
lease stipulations that will provide for environmental protection and land reclamation; and
(d) When an environmental impact statement covering the proposed lease has
been prepared when required under the National Environmental Policy Act.
Id. at 865-66. In answer to supplemental interrogatories ordered by the appellate court in
the present case, the Department of the Interior announced that it is not now offering any
further leases in the province under the short-term leasing program. Id. a t 866.
13. 514 F.2d a t 865 nn.13, 14.
14. Id. a t 865 n.15. An impact statement filed for one of these plans was sustained
as adequate in Redding v. Morton, Civil No. 74-12-BLG (D. Mont., May 1, 1974). The
statement covered 770 acres of the 30,876 acre tract leased to Westmoreland Resources
by the Crow Indians. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit enjoined any further mining activity
on the leased land outside the 770 acres until a comprehensive statement covering the
remaining 30,000 acres had been prepared. Cady v. Morton, Civil No. 74-1984 (9th Cir.,
June 19, 1975).
15. 514 F.2d a t 865 n.15.
16. The affidavit of Secretary Morton stated:
[Tlhe granting or approval of leases, special use permits and all types of rightsof-way across public lands, the delivery and sale of water and approval of mining
plans . . . will be held in abeyance . . . or submitted to the Under Secretary
for review and concurrence prior to execution.
514 F.2d at 864.
17. The district court termed the NGPRP "a study project and not a program for
development." Id. a t 867. Judge Wright referred to it variously as: "[Tlhe Government's
attempt to formulate a regional program that will enable i t to control development," id.
at 876, and "a massive . . . study . . . to assess . . . impacts that development of the
Province would cause." Id. at 863. He assumes that the proposal for regional federal action
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impact statement as that term is used in NEPA.18

B. Statutory Requirements-Judicial Interpretations
Congress enacted NEPA to insure that federal agency planning and decision-making will include the proper consideration of
environmental value^.^ To achieve effective implementation,
Congress wrote certain "action-forcing" provisions into section
102 of the Act.20Of these provisions, the one in section 102(2)(C)
has become the enforcement tool most frequently used by the
courts.21That section requires federal agencies to prepare environmental impact statements on all "major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human e n ~ i r o n m e n t . " ~ ~
Judicial interpretations of NEPA's impact statement requirements have been numerous and diverse due to undefined
language in key sections of the Act. Indeed, the Act's ambiguity
causes two particularly difficult problems faced by the court in
the instant case. First, since the Act does not define "major federal actions," it is not clear whether related "major federal actions" must be treated jointly by a single impact statement?
Second, since the statute does not specify, it is unclear a t what
point in an agency's decision-making process an impact statement must be prepared.
1.

Measuring the scope of "major federal actions"
Because NEPA does not define "major federal actions," en-

will be contained in the final NGPRP report. Id. a t 882. In dissent, Judge MacKinnon
says, "the Study was never intended to produce a comprehensive regional plan for coal
development," and cites the Draft Interim Report as stating that "[tlhe primary objective of the [NGPRP] is to provide information and a comprehensive analysis that can
be used to place the potential impacts of coal development into perspective and thereby
assist . . . in the management of the natural and human resources of this region." Id. at
892.
18. 514 F.2d a t 877-78, 892.
19. See S. REP. NO. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
20. 42 U.S.C. 5 4332. For legislative history concerning the necessity of the "actionforcing" provisions see S. REP. NO. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 9, 19 (1969).
ENVIRONMEN21. See Anderson, The National Environmental Policy Act, in FEDERAL
TAL LAW239 (1974).
22. 42 U.S.C. 8 4332(2)(C) (1970).
23. Only one Supreme Court opinion discusses NEPA's requirements concerning the
proper scope of "major federal actions." Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 422 U.S. 289 (1975) [hereinafter cited as SCRAP].
The context of the SCRAP opinion, however, distinguishes it from the present case.
SCRAP dealt with specific delineations of discretionary power to the ICC and a highly
structured ICC hearing procedure. In contrast, the present case involves the less structured procedure of the Department of the Interior.
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vironmental groups frequently challenge the geographic boundaries that agencies have designated for their actions. In a typical
case, the government files an impact statement on a particular
project; environmentalists then claim that the statement should
have covered all similar federal projects in the entire region.24
Although the courts have had to develop their own tests for determining whether to require regional impact statements in such
cases, the central inquiry in each judicial decision appears to be
the same: How interrelated or interdependent are the individual
actions? To determine the degree of interdependency among federal actions, the courts examine the effect that the individual
projects have on each other. For example, if construction of one
facility will require, in order to make that facility useful, federal
construction of additional facilities, the courts view the first construction project as an increment of a larger action requiring a
comprehensive environmental analysis.25
In Scientists' Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. AECZ6
(SIPI), the District of Columbia Circuit held that a comprehensive impact statement was necessary to assess the cumulative
impact of the Atomic Energy Commission's entire Liquid Metal
Fast Breeder Reactor Program even though separate statements
had been prepared for the program's anticipated initial test facility and demonstration plant.27The court determined that the test
facility and demonstration plant would have no significance as
independent energy sources absent the entire fast-breeder reactor
program. Indeed, anticipated construction of those facilities represented merely initial increments of the total time, money, and
research invested to achieve breeder reactor feasibility. Such initial investments were likely to foreclose consideration of alternative energy sources and make the commercial marketing of fastbreeder reactors the nation's top priority energy program. For this
reason, the court determined that NEPA required more than
piecemeal consideration of the impact of separate facilities."
24. E.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Trout Unlimited v.
Morton, 509 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1974); Sierra Club v. Stamm, 507 F.2d 788 (10th Cir.
1974); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Armstrong, 487 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1973).
25. See Scientists' Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C.
Cir. 1973); Conservation Society of Southern Vermont, Inc. v. Secretary of Transportation, 508 F.2d 927 (2nd Cir. 1974); Indian Lookout Alliance v. Volpe, 484 F.2d 11 (8th Cir.
1973); Jones v. Lynn, 477 F.2d 885 (1st Cir. 1973).
26. 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
27. Id. a t 1082. For a more detailed explanation of the analysis and holding of SIPI
see 87 HARV.L. REV.1050 (1974).
28. See 481 F.2d a t 1082, 1089-90, 1096-98.
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Similarly, in Conservation Society of Southern Vermont, Inc.
v. Secretary of T r a n s p o r t a t i ~ n the
, ~ ~ Second Circuit Court of
Appeals held that improvement of a 21-mile segment of U.S.
Route 7 in Vermont could not proceed until the government prepared an impact statement covering the entire three-state 280mile ~orridor.~"
Although no comprehensive corridor development
plan existed, the court relied on findings that the federal defendants had a goal of converting Route 7 into a superhighway, a goal
"possible of accomplishment with legislative and Federal approval over a long-range period of time."31 The court based its
decision on factors very similar to those in SIPI. For instance, the
court stated that the early commitment of federal funds to the
project would eliminate any consideration of alternatives to development and that the improvement of separate segments along
the corridor would create a "synergistic pressure" to complete
widening along the entire route.32
~ ~ Trout
By way of contrast, in Sierra Club v. S t a n ~ r nand
Unlimited u. Morton,34the courts upheld the autonomy of individual actions challenged as being interdependent." In Stamm,
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Strawberry
Aqueduct and Collection System was an independent major federal action, not merely an increment of the Central Utah Project.
Thus, no comprehensive impact statement was required.36The
court based its holding on two findings: (1) the aqueduct and
collection system could achieve its designed purpose whether or
not any other components of the Central Utah Project were constructed, and (2) the impact of the system would not vary according to future actions taken by the go~ernrnent.~'
In contrast to the
dependent nature of the individual breeder reactor in SIPI, the
29. 508 F.2d 927 (2nd Cir. 1974).
30. Id. a t 933-36.
31. Id. a t 929.
32. Id. a t 929-30.
33. 507 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1974).
34. 509 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1974).
35. The Stamm court relied in part on Environmental Defense Fund v. Armstrong,
356 F. Supp. 131 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd, 487 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1973).In Armstrong, the district
court explained the rationale behind the "independent major federal action" interpretation of NEPA.
So long as each major federal action is undertaken individually and not as an
indivisable, integral part of an integrated . . . system, then the requirements
of NEPA are determined on an individual major federal action basis.
356 F. Supp. at 139.
36. 507 F.2d a t 792-93.
37. Id. a t 791.
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Strawberry system had significance absent the larger regional
project.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Trout Unlimited
found the first phase of the Teton Dam and Reservoir Project to
be "substantially independent of the second," obviating the need
for a comprehensive impact statement." The court emphasized
that the utility of the first phase did not depend in any way upon
construction of the second. Rather, second phase construction
was contingent upon a separate feasibility study that would take
into account the commitment of resources to the first phase. In
light of these findings, the court distinguished SIPrs fast-breeder
program as having stages sufficiently indivisible that it would be
"irrational" to commence "the first stage if subsequent phases
were not also ~ n d e r t a k e n , " ~ ~
2.

Timing the impact statement

The courts have looked to two phrases of NEPA section 102
in determining the proper timing for impact statement preparation. One phrase requires government agencies to "include in
every recommendation or report on proposals for . . . major federal actions . . . a detailed" impact statement. A second phrase
provides that the statement "shall accompany the proposal
through the existing agency review proces~es."~~
In addition to the
wording of NEPA, some courts have relied on guidelines for impact statement preparation prepared by the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) and published soon after NEPA took effect." The CEQ guidelines call for the preparation and circulation
of draft impact statements "as early as possible in the agency
review process in order to permit agency decision-makers and
outside reviewers" to meaningfully assess the impact of the proposed action." The CEQ guidelines further provide that no deter38. 509 F.2d a t 1284-85.
39. Id. a t 1285 & n.13.
40. 42 U.S.C. 8 4332(2)(C) (1970).
41. For a thorough history and discussion of the CEQ guidelines see Note, The Council on Environmental Quality's Guidelines and Their Influence on the National EnvironU.L. REV.547 (1974). Various courts do not give the CEQ
mental Policy Act, 23 CATHOLIC
guidelines equal weight. Some courts use the guidelines as merely advisory. E.g., Hiram
Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 424 (5th Cir. 1973). Others give them great
deference. E.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps. of Engineers, 325 F. Supp.
728, 744 (E.D. Ark. 1971), aff'd, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972).
42. 40 C.F.R. 8 1500.7(a) (1974).
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minative agency action on a proposal is to be taken before a final
statement is

In the instant case, the federal government denied being engaged in any Northern Great Plains regional coal development
program. It therefore argued that no regional "major federal action" existed and, consequently, that NEPA required no comprehensive impact statement." In rebuttal, the environmentalists
argued that comprehensive federal planning is necessary for adequate management of the nation's resources. Since the government had no plan for regional coal development, it must file a
comprehensive impact statement before taking further action.
The court determined that the federal government, despite
the absence of a formal development plan, contemplated a major
federal action that would require preparation of a comprehensive
impact statement. The Department of the Interior's study of the
possibilities for resource development in the area,45the Department's recognition of the necessity for coordinated regional development, and the purposes of the ongoing NGPRP46all constituted
--

--

-

-

43. Id..$ 1500.11(b).
44. 514 F.2d at 872-73. Additionally, the intervening appellees (note 2 supra) made
arguments concerning the case's justiciability and the environmentalists' standing. On the
issue of justiciability, intervening appellees argued: (1) Since the environmentalists did
not challenge specific past government actions, or present evidence of ripeness of alleged
future actions on the Northern Great Plains, the constitutional case or controversy requirement was not satisfied; and (2) Since the agency had not taken final action on the
project, judicial review was not available. See Brief for Intervening Appellees a t 32-34,
Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The appellate court found the case
to be justiciable, stating that the environmentalists' allegations demonstrated that government actions to control Northern Great Plains coal development were sufficient to
state a case or controversy. 514 F.2d at 868 n.20.
The district court did not reach the issue of the environmentalists' standing. On
appeal, the intervening appellees argued that since the environmentalists had failed to
show how any member of their organizations would be harmed by the challenged government activity, the district court properly denied Sierra Club's petition for injunctive relief.
Brief for Intervening Appellees a t 42, Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
The appellate court acknowledged that standing "can be deemed to have been proved"
by only one appellant, Northern Plains Resource Council, and suggested that on remand
the environmentalists should be allowed to introduce evidence of their standing to enable
the district court to rule on the issue. 514 F.2d at 868-70.
45. The NGPRP is the most recent of three studies initiated by the Department of
the Interior to study aspects of industrial development related to coal production on the
Northern Great Plains. The first two studies, the Montana-Wyoming Aqueducts Study
and the North Central Power Study, were suspended before completion. 514 F.2d a t 863,
875-76.
46. Id. a t 875-78.
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evidence that the government contemplated control of regional
coal development. Nevertheless, the court was uncertain whether
the federal action had ripened sufficiently to require immediate
preparation of an impact statement. It therefore remanded the
case and instructed the district court to allow the government to
decide whether the time was appropriate to file an impact statement." The court also approved, in theory, the legal basis for the
environmentalists' argument that NEPA imposes on the federal
government an affirmative duty to comprehensively plan.48
In dissent, Judge MacKinnon stated that since the court did
not require the government to file an impact statement, the only
"practical effect'' of the majority's decision was "to continue the
temporary injunction."" He disagreed with such a continuation
since the activities enjoined were already covered by impact
. ~ ~ enstatements whose sufficiency had not been ~ h a l l e n g e dThe
vironmentalists' suit was inappropriate because it was "divorced
from the review of a statement covering an individual project."
In permitting the suit, the majority improperly relied on the SIPI
holding that a challenge to a comprehensive program does not
have to be made through an attack on an individual project.51In
the instant case, no comprehensive impact statement was necessary because the record showed no regional program or comprehensive commitment of resources similar to those found in SIPL5*

The instant case raises three significant issues: (1)Does the
scope of the "major federal actions" provision of section 102(2)(C)
of NEPA mandate a regional impact statement covering the government's coal development activities on the Northern Great
Plains? (2) What standard should be applied to determine when
the federal government must file an impact statement? (3) Does
NEPA impose on the government an affirmative duty to comprehensively plan?

A.

The Scope of "Major Federal Actions"

In determining whether the government's coal development
-

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

-

at 881-82.
at 873-74.
at 884.
at 892-93. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
at 868-70 n.20.
at 884, 888.
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activities on the Northern Great Plains constituted a comprehensive major federal action requiring a regional impact statement,
the court followed the SIPI and Conservation Society casesUand
distinguished a line of contrary decisions, including the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Trout Unlimited and the Tenth Circuit's
decision in Stamm.54Nevertheless, the court failed to adequately
demonstrate that the Department of the Interior's actions on the
Northern Great Plains were more closely analogous to the facts
of the SIPI and Conservation Society cases than to the facts litigated in S t a m m and Trout Unlimited? A comparison of the
present case to SIPI and Conservation Society reveals significant
factual differences that undermine the court's reliance on the
rationale of those cases.
The court attempted to bring the present case within the
reasoning of SIP1 and Conservation Society in two ways. First,
the court determined that the government had treated its attempts a t regional control of coal development in such a way as
to require a comprehensive impact statement." The nature of the
regional activity in the present case, however, differs markedly
from the federal activities considered in SIPI and Conservation
Society. The AEC in SIPI published a ten-volume program giving
the agency's specific goals and projected time-tables for their
a c c ~ m p l i s h m e n tAlso,
. ~ ~ the federal plan in Conservation Society
was sufficiently certain to enable the court to determine the exact
length of the Route 7 corridor as well as the location of the segmented improvement projects in various stages of c o n s t r u ~ t i o n . ~ ~
53. Id. at 871-78; see notes 26-32 and accompanying text supra. It should be noted
that soon after the present case was decided, the United States Supreme Court, in a
summary action, vacated the Second Circuit's Conservation Society decision and remanded the case "for further consideration in light of' SCRAP. Coleman v. Conservation
Society of Southern Vermont, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 19 (1975). Since no opinion appeared, it is
unclear whether the Court considered the comprehensive impact statement requirement
of the case to be improper. But the Court's action may draw into question the validity of
the Conservation Society holding as precedent for the present decision.
54. 514 F.2d at 878 n.29; see notes 33-39 and accompanying text supra.
55. The court distinguished S t a m m and Trout Unlimited because those cases did not
involve "a direct challenge to the need for a regional" impact statement. 514 F.2d at 878
n.29. The dissent sharply criticized the majority for making this technical distinction.
Judge MacKinnon argued that it is unreasonable to disregard such cases as S t a m m and
Dout Unlimited merely because they indirectly assessed the need for a regional impact
statement by way of determining the sufficiency of a challenged individual statement. 514
F.2d at 889.
56. 514 F.2d at 875.
57. 481 F.2d at 1083-84. The AEC had forecast that approximately 500 fast-breeder
power plants would be built by the turn of the century and another 700 "in the first decade
of the 21st century." Id. at 1084-85 n.18.
58. See 508 F.2d at 934 & 936 n.43a.
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In contrast, the regional plan for Great Plains development is
tentative and ill-defined. In fact, the court admitted that the
government's exact role in Northern Great Plains development
and the specific geographical area to be affected were uncertain.5g
Second, the court suggested that resources were about to be
irretrievably committed to the government's Great Plains development program.60To prevent such commitment, the court temporarily enjoined further mining activity in the Powder River
Basin. Specifically in response to the dissent's contention that
the instant case lacked evidence of a synergistic commitment of
resources, a consideration crucial to the reasoning of SIPI and
Conservation Society, the court suggested that pressure for further development would result from the influx of manpower
drawn to the area and that provision of water for one mining
operation could irretrievably commit that area's water supply to
the exclusion of any future mines." Although these allegations,
if proven, would justify the majority's reliance on SIPI and
Conservation Society, the court's predictions of a regional commitment of resources are simply not substantiated. Further, the
court failed to point to any evidence showing that existing impact
statements had inadequately treated these possibilities. In short,
the court based its reliance on SIPI and Conservation Society on
an unproven factual premise, a premise that the court itself created out of whole cloth.
The court should have refused to enjoin work on the individual projects in the Powder River Basin until challengers proved
that the impact statement covering that area was inadeq~ate.'~
59. Id. a t 881.
60. See 514 F.2d a t 864-66, 881, 883.
61. Id. a t 877 n.28.
62. See text accompanying note 7 supra. The recent case of Cady v. Morton, Civil
No. 74-1984 (9th Cir., June 19, 1975), decided three days after the court's decision in the
instant case, is instructive on this point. Appellants challenged the sufficiency of a Department of the Interior impact statement filed on a 770-acre mining plan because it failed
to comprehensively consider the other 30,106 acres of land included in the original coal
lease. The court held that NEPA required preparation of a comprehensive statement
covering the 30,106 acres, and enjoined mining activity on that portion pending completion of the statement; development of the 770 acres included in the original statement was
permitted because the court found that the statement filed for that portion sufficiently
treated the environmental impact.
Applied to the instant case, Cady suggests that the court would be justified in enjoining any mining activity outside the areas presently covered by impact statements if it
determined that a regional statement was necessary; but it could not properly enjoin
mining covered by the Powder River Basin impact statement unless that statement was
proven to be insufficient.
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B. A Standard for Determining the Timing of Impact
Statements
The court determined that a comprehensive major federal
action in the Northern Great Plains was contemplated but did
not require a regional impact statement since the federal government had not yet defined its role in development of the region.63
In other words, the government's actions had not "ripened" to the
point where an impact statement was mandated. The court assumed that the government would define its role in an NGPRP
interim report and ordered it to decide within 30 days of issuance
of the report whether it would prepare an impact statement. An
analysis of NEPA's language and the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Aberdeen & Rockfish R. R. u. Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency procedure^^^ (SCRAP), however, reveal that
the court misconstrued NEPA's timing requirement for the preparation of an impact statement.
In interpreting NEPA's timing language in SCRAP, the Supreme Court held that section 102's requirement that the impact
statement "shall accompany the proposal through the existing
agency review processes" does not indicate the proper timing for
statement preparation but merely provides that once the impact
statement is prepared it must accompany the proposal.65Another
statutory requirement-that agencies include an impact statement "in every recommendation or report on proposals for . . .
major federal actions"-represents NEPA's timing requirement
for impact statement preparation. "Under this sentence of the
statute [the sentence quoted immediately above], the time a t
which an agency must prepare the final 'statement' is the time
at which it makes a recommendation or report on a proposal for
federal action? NEPA's language must refer only to preparation
of the final impact statement, "for no other kind of statement is
mentioned in the statute?'
The three-judge district court in SCRAP had held that an
oral hearing conducted by the ICC to consider the railroads' petition for a rate increase was an "agency review process" a t which
a final impact statement should have been issued.68The Supreme
63. 514 F.2d at 880-82.
64. 422 U.S. 289 (1975) (decided June 24, 1975, one week after the court's decision in
the instant case).
65. Id. a t 320.
66. Id. (emphasis in original).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 319-20.
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Court reversed and pointed out that prior to the issuance of the
ICC report on the applicant's proposed general rate increase (the
report was issued after the oral hearing) no federal "proposal,
recommendation or report" had been made; rather, only a private
proposal for new rates had been submitted by the railroads?
NEPA, therefore, did not require the ICC to file an impact statement any earlier than the date of issuance of its report.
In the present case, if any proposals for regional development
exist, they are private proposals in the nature of applications for
rights-of-way, lease issuance, and mining plan approval. Indeed,
the court tacitly conceded that no federal proposal had been
made when it presumed that such a proposal "would be embodied
in the [as yet unprepared] final NGPRP report." The court,
nevertheless, required the government to decide whether to prepare an impact statement within 30 days after the Department
of the Interior issued the NGPRP interim reporta70This order was
based on the court's notion that NEPA requires a statement to
"precede the 'recommendation or report on proposals' "71 in order
to "aid agency planning and decision-making before the final
recommended proposal for action is made."72
In light of SCRAP, the court was wrong in interpreting
NEPA to require that an impact statement precede the recornmendation or report on proposals for major federal actions. The
statute does not require final impact statements to be available
at any time before the agency issues a report on the proposal.73
Although the court's statement is not consistent with CEQ instructions respecting draft impact statement^,'^ those instructions do not constitute mandatory requirements; rather, they are
69. Id. a t 320.
70. 514 F.2d a t 882.
71. Id. a t 879. To support this notion, Judge Wright cites his opinion in Calvert Cliffs'
Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1971), which states that
NEPA requires "environmental issues [to] be considered a t every important stage in the
decision making process." The Supreme Court in SCRAP, however, recently decided that
"[tlo the extent to which Calvert Cliffs' . . . read[s] the requirement that the statement
accompany the proposal through the existing agency review processes differently" [than
the SCRAP interpretation, it] "would appear to conflict with the statute." 422 U.S. a t
321 n.20. Thus, Judge Wright appears to be unjustified in relying upon the Calvert Cliffs'
statement.
72. 514 F.2d a t 881-82 n.35.
73. See text accompanying notes 66-67 supra.
74. See text accompanying note 42 supra. The Supreme Court in SCRAP strengthened the significance to NEPA of the CEQ instructions respecting draft .statements by
noting that the ICC had procedurally complied with NEPA by making draft statements
available to the public prior to the hearings on the rate increases. 422 U.S. a t 321.
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subject to agency prer~gative.'~
Therefore, the judiciary can do no
more than encourage agency compliance with the letter and spirit
of the CEQ guidelines; it cannot require, as the court did in the
present case, the federal government to submit draft statements.

C. NEPA and Mandatory Federal Planning
The district court in the instant case held that NEPA section
102(2)(A) does not require the government to engage in regional
planning and that, because no Great Plains regional plan for coal
development existed, no impact statement was necessary.76On
appeal, the environmentalists argued that the duty to prepare a
regional impact statement should be imposed on the government
even though no regional plan had been created.77Appellants contended that the district court erred in interpreting NEPA to
demand of the government no more environmental planning than
the government chooses to do. Such an interpretation, they
argued, would allow an agency to avoid NEPA's requirements
simply by resolving not to construct a regional plan.78
In dictum, the circuit court expressed a favorable attitude
toward the environmentalists' legal arguments on this point,79
and thereby, as the dissent pointed out, "laid the groundwork for
the perpetuation of this . . . position in future cases."80The court
cited three sources of authority to support the legality. of
appellants' argument: the CEQ guidelines, dictum from Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. u. Morton,81and the policy language of NEPA section 101.82Analysis of these authorities reveals
fundamental weaknesses in the court's position.
75. The interim guidelines, published by the CEQ shortly after NEPA took effect,
introduced the concept of optional draft impact statements. The purpose of this procedure
was to help agencies receive feedback on their proposals from concerned sources. Such
comments were to accompany the final statements through the review process. Note, The
Council on Environmental Quality's Guidelines and Their Influence on the National
Environmental Policy Act, 23 CATHOLIC
U.L. REV.547, 554 (1974).
76. Sierra Club v. Morton, No. 1182-73 (D.D.C., Feb. 14, 1974), Conclusions of Law
5 & 6 (reprinted in Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari a t 98A-99A, petition for cert. filed sub
nom. Frizzell v. Sierra Club, 44 U.S.L.W. 3239 (U.S. Aug. 9, 1975) (No. 552)).
77. See Brief for Appellants a t 47-58, Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir.
19%).
78. Id. a t 52.
79. The court stated that it "approve[d], in theory, the legal basis for appellant's
argument." It noted, however, the "practical difficulties" of actually implementing the
idea, such as intrusion "on agency discretion while overly involving the courts in the dayto-day business of running the government." 514 F.2d a t 874-75.
80. Id. a t 892.
81. 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
82. 514 F.2d a t 873-75.
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The legal basis for mandatory planning

a. CEQ guidelines. It is unclear what language of the CEQ
guidelines the court interprets as supporting the notion of imposed planning since no specific citation appears in the opinion
and no language in the guidelines explicitly requires such a practice. If, however, the notion is clear from the general focus of the
guidelines, the proper weight to be given the CEQ-created requirement remains an unsettled question. The court indicates
that the CEQ guidelines are "entitled to great respect,"83 but
concedes that the cases it cites for this proposition concerned
instances where the agency interpreting the statute was charged
with its admini~tration.~~
In contrast, CEQ has no statutory authority to enforce NEPA provision^:^^ it acts in an advisory capacity with respect to the executive branch and depends upon agency
cooperation for its effectivenes~.~~
At the very least, therefore, the
deference given the CEQ guidelines by the court in the present
case appears both excessive and unwarranted.
b. Dictum from Natural Resources Defense Council. As
additional support for its position, the court citess7the following
from Natural Resources Defense Council:
What NEPA infused into the decision-making process in 1969
was a directive as to environmental impact statements that was
meant to implement the Congressional objectives of Government coordination, [and] a comprehensive approach to environmental management, . . . [and thus avoid] environmental
decision-making wherein "policy is established by default and
inaction" . . . .88

The court admits that it reads this dictum broadly to mean that
under NEPA, comprehensive planning may be imposed on an
agency that is unwilling to take the initiati~e.~'
This broad reading is questionable, however, since the quoted language is prefaced and limited by the phrase, "as to environmental impact
statements." In essence, the quote indicates that by requiring
83. Id. at 873-74 & n.24.
84. Id. at 873-74 n.24.
85. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4341 et seq. (1970); 514 F.2d at 873-74 n.24.
ON ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW4 9.01(b) (1975); Note, The
86. See 2 F. GRAD,TREATISE
Council on Environmental Quality's Guidelines and Their Influence on the National
U.L. REV.547 (1974).
Environmental Policy Act, 23 CATHOLIC
87. 514 F.2d at 874.
88. 458 F.2d at 836 (emphasis added).
89. 514 F.2d at 874.
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impact statements for major federal actions, NEPA dictates how
the planning of a federal action should be conducted-in an interdisciplinary fashion in which agencies consider the environmental
effects of their programs through the medium of impact statequote cannot be properly read as meaning that
ment~.~VI'he
NEPA contains a directive, which it clearly does not, indicating
to the government what projects to plan or whether it need plan
a t all.
c. NEPA section 101. As final support for its notion that
NEPA requires privately imposed federal planning, the court
states that the provisions of section 101 directing the federal government "to use all practical means . . . to improve and coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs and resources" may be
judicially enforced.g1Thus, violation of such provisions "might
justify a judicial directive to coordinate various major federal
actions into one comprehensive . . . action, followed by a directive ordering" a comprehensive impact statement for this courtorganized action.92The court concedes, however, that an agency
would be in substantive violation of NEPA only if its failure to
plan comprehensively was found to be arbitrary or c a p r i c i o u ~ . ~ ~
In quoting section 101, the court omitted language that limits
the scope of the section's possible interpretation:
I n order to carry out the policy set forth i n this chapter, it is the
continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to use all
practicable means, consistent with other essential considerations of national policy, to improve and coordinate Federal
plans, functions, programs, and resources . . . .94

Both the syntax and the location of the language omitted by the
court suggest an important consideration: an agency is not authorized by the Act to ignore other expressions of national policy,
nor is a court justified in enforcing NEPA's provisions in a way
that would violate such policy. Yet in its interpretation and enforcement of section 101 in the instant case, the court appears to
have disregarded a fundamental national policy: executive agencies are to be permitted to exercise discretion in the organization
and implementation of their own programs. Absent a clear statutory provision requiring planning, and to that extent eliminating
-

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

-

--

-

42 U.S.C. § 4332(A)-(D) (1970).
514 F.2d at 874.
Id.
Id. at 875.
42 U.S.C. 4 4331(b) (1970) (emphasis added).

-
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agency discretion, the court's significant intrusion in the present
case into discretionary agency decisions appears unjustifiable.
Even if it were consistent with national policy to impose a
planning requirement on an agency, the court itself concedes that
"an agency could not be found to have failed to plan comprehensively in violation of NEPA unless that failure was so gross as to
be arbitrary and c a p r i c i o ~ s . "In
~ ~the instant case a t least, such
a determination seems unlikely. The Department of the Interior's
good faith effort to implement NEPA is demonstrated by the
short-term limited leasing program, the National Coal impact
statement, and the subregional cumulative impact statement
covering the Powder River Basin?
2. Judicial us. congressional imposition of planning
requirements

Although the court's argument about the legality of privately
imposed federal planning is weak, it cannot be denied that comprehensive planning in the management of natural resources is
the ideal. In response to congressional inquiries, the Department
of the Interior candidly admitted that the major deficiency in the
traditional coal leasing system has been the practice of awarding
leases on demand without concern for environmental consequences." The intense current pressure placed on the Department of the Interior by the nation's demand for energy development may again result in the nearsighted exploitation that characterized the nation's nineteenth century expansion. Comprehensive planning would serve as a hedge against that type of nearsightedness and would prevent the establishment of energy development policy by default. The nation could thus avoid inefficient
use of resources resulting from piecemeal decision -makingY
Nevertheless, as desirable as federal planning may be, it is
evident that Congress did not intend that NEPA require comprehensive planning. Indeed, in the six years of NEPA's existence,
no court has ever held, as the court in the instant case suggests,
that NEPA requires comprehensive planning. Rather, all other
-

-

95. 514 F.2d at 874 n.25.
96. See notes 11-12, 14-16 and accompanying text supra. Judge Wright acknowledged
the Department of the Interior's good faith in establishing its interim policy, but expressed
concern that there remained potential for irretrievable commitment of resources without
proper environmental consideration. 514 F.2d at 883.
97. Brief for Appellants at 49, Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
98. S. REP.NO. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1969).
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courts, when confronted with demands that they require the government to comprehensively plan, have taken the position expressed by the district court in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc.
v. A r m s t r ~ n g :"Plaintiffs'
~~
suggestion that there is a need for
comprehensive study . . . should be made to the Congress, and
not to the court."looIn light of the fact that no statutory authority
exists for mandatory planning, any other position would reflect,
as does the position of the court in the instant case, a callous
disregard of the proper limits of judicial power.
99. 356 F. Supp. 131 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
100. Id. at 139.

